Longford Royal Commission

The Terms of Reference for the Longford Royal Commission were released by the Premier, Mr Kennett, on October 13.

The Terms of Reference were formulated and finalised in co-operation with the Honourable Sir Daryl Dawson, who will chair the Commission.

They will allow Sir Daryl to do whatever he believes is necessary to establish the cause of the fire and subsequent explosion at Longford on 25 September and the ice plug incident in June.

TERMS OF REFERENCE: LONGFORD ROYAL COMMISSION

Introduction:

The document formally constituting the Royal Commission will include the following introduction:

A. Gas extracted by Esso Australia Resources Ltd ("Esso") and BHP Petroleum (Bass Strait) Pty Ltd ("BHP") is processed at gas production and processing facilities at Longford, Victoria ("the Longford facilities") operated by Esso.

B. On Friday 25 September 1998 an explosion and fire occurred at the Longford facilities.

C. As a result of that explosion and fire two persons were killed, a number of persons were injured and all gas supply from the Longford facilities ceased.

D. It appeared to the Governor in Council that the available supply of gas was or was likely to become less than was sufficient for the reasonable requirements of the community and accordingly the Governor in Council, acting under s.62F of the Gas Industry Act 1994 ("the Act") by proclamation declared that Part 6A of the Act was to apply.

E. Following that proclamation, directions were given under Part 6A of the Act to effect the cessation of all but essential gas usage in those parts of Victoria which rely upon the supply of gas from the Longford facilities.

Terms of Reference:

The Terms of Reference of the Royal Commission will be as follows:

1. What were the causes of:
            (a) the explosion and fire which occurred at the Longford facilities on Friday 25 September 1998;
            (b) the failure of gas supply from the Longford facilities following that explosion and fire.

2. Whether any of the following factors caused or contributed to the occurrence of that explosion, fire and failure of gas supply, namely:

(a) the design of the Longford facilities including the interdependence of

(i) the plants and other components which comprise those facilities; and
(ii) the Longford facilities and other facilities at, or upstream of, the Esso site at Longford;

(b) operating standards, practices and policies;
(c) maintenance standards, practices and policies;
(d) asset management practices and policies;
(e) risk management procedures and emergency procedures in force at the time of that occurrence;
(f) any relevant changes in the standards, practices and policies referred to in sub-paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) which had taken place before that occurrence;
(g) the hydrate incident at the Longford facilities which occurred in June 1998, and any other previous incidents considered by the Board to be relevant;
(h) whether there was any breach of, or non compliance with, the requirements of any relevant statute or regulation by Esso or BHP.

3. What steps should be taken by Esso or BHP to prevent or lessen the risk of:

(a)a repetition of the incidents which occurred at the Longford facilities on 25 September 1998; or

(b) a further disruption of gas supply from those facilities;

Recommendations:

The document will include a direction to the members of the Royal Commission that they make such recommendations arising out of their inquiry as they consider appropriate, including recommendations regarding any legislative or administrative changes that are necessary or desirable.

(News Release, Office of the Premier, October 13, 1998)